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Consolidation, IMF Programmes and Vulnerable
Groups (especially poor children) in SSA
Notes by R. H. Green
I. Introduction
These notes are based on discussion and study of IMF programmes or 
attempts to negotiate programmes in Zimababwe, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zaire, 
Upper Volta and Senegal. The greatest amount of first hand experience 
relates to Zimbabwe and Tanzania.
They are not intended as a complete review either of SSA economic
malaise or of IMF conditionality. Because they centre on a) what the 
IMF might do both to ensure that its conditionality and advice did not 
rest disproportionately on vulnerable groups (especially children) and 
b) what the IMF might do to assist in encouraging programmes (presumably 
funded by donors) to alleviate negative impact on weak/vulnerable 
groups, they do not go into great detail on national political
perspectives or programme design.
The argument is not that the IMF can cause SSA governments to be
sensitive to the needs of their vulnerable citizens. There are limits 
to what any outside body can do and UNICEF, ILO, IFAD are much more 
likely to be effective at such sensitisation than IMF with IBRD and
UNESCO intermediately placed. Nor is it argued that consolidation/ 
adjustment can be managed costlessly or even at no cost to vulnerable 
people. (Albeit given how severely many SSA economies have deteriorated 
since 1978-79, any adjustment/consolidation programme which does not 
produce a speedy halting and at least partial reversal of downward 
momentum is unlikely to last long enough to work in the medium or long 
terra. Further for many vulnerable groups further sacrifices mean levels 
of malnutrition and ill health, absence of education and death rates 
such as to threaten present existence and future ability to participate 
either socially or economically. Neither at the national economic nor
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the vulnerable persons level are the margins above survival comparable 
to those in even a low income - e.g. Portugal - European state.)
What is argued is that:
a. the IMF should not oppose (and/or be seen to oppose) policy designs 
intended to reduce the impact of consolidation on vulnerable groups 
so long as a serious overall programme package is proposed;
b. the IMF should be sensitive to the human, social and economic costs 
of marginalisation, degradation and life shortening of vulnerable 
people - especially children - in the same way it is, e.g. 
sensitive to the economic and social costs of rapid inflation;
c. the IMF should consider how - in conjunction with its programmes 
(especially 3rd and over credit tranche and EFF) - it can support 
efforts of states seeking financial assistance (e.g from IDA, EDF, 
bilateral, IFAD, UNICEF) to support programmes keyed to reducing 
the impact of consolidation on children and other vulnerable 
persons.
These notes relate primarily to SSA. However many of the points, 
issues, approaches would appear relevant to low and lower middle income 
economies in other parts of the world, e.g. Tunisia, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, Grenada, Bolivia.
II. Vulnerable Peoples1 Needs/Mechanisms/Risks
Who are vulnerable in SSA varies from country to country and time to 
time. No universal ’read off’ is likely to do more than offer a 
starting check list for national identification (which realistically 
must be done by national bodies with assistance from - e.g. - UNICEF, 
IBRD, IFAD, UNESCO not primarily by the IMF whose duty is not to do such 
work but to pay serious attention to it when presented to it.)
In general one can say that low income groups - and especially women and 
children in low income households - are at risk. Who are poor and what
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the relative size of these groups are varies significantly:
a. rural households lacking the ability/resources to produce enough to 
meet their own food plus enough of a surplus to sell to meet other 
basic needs and with poor access to basic education, health, pure 
water, relevant agricultural services (and in some cases fuel) are 
usually the largest group;
b. within them rural landless are not - in most cases - as significant 
as in Asia or Latin America (i.e. group "a" is by no means simply 
or even predominantly constrained by land shortage), but they are 
no longer insignificant. Migrant workers (e.g. in Southern Africa 
and coastal West Africa) are often forced to seek work (often 
abroad) by land shortage as well as low productivity. In more 
densely settled areas, e.g. Owerri Plateau and Kano Plain
(Nigeria), Nile irrigation schemes (Sudan), Mount Kilimanjaro-Meru 
zone (Tanzania), Rwanda, Burundi, Central and Lake Zune (Kenya), 
land shortage and rural landless poor are rapidly becoming 
increasingly prevalent;
c. urban poverty was, perhaps, much less significant than rural as 
recently as 1960. However, while in terms of numbers still
smaller, urban vulnerable groups are now both large, rapidly 
growing and very vulnerable indeed as even quick tours of the 
squatter areas and exurbs of - e.g. - Dakar, Kinshasa, Lagos,
Accra, Lusaka, Nairobi and the Three Towns (Khartoum - Khartoum 
North - Omdurman) should show any sensitive observer. While 
usually having better access to water-education-health than the 
rural vulnerable, the urban often have even worse access to food 
(especially when rapid price increases and wage restraint are
combined), fuel, shelter and even poorer sanitary conditions 
(especially when environmental sanitation and immunisation 
programmes suffer from budget cutting exercises).
d. within this cluster of urban vulnerable people the "informaln (i.e. 
small scale self employed, casually employed, small employer 
employed) is usually larger and poorer than either nformal wage1* or 
unemployed sub-sectors. (The truly unemployed have to be less poor
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to stay alive - in fact casual labour and self employment are the 
normal overt urban African Face of Unemployment.) How much poorer 
(and more vulnerable) varies. In Dar es Salaam survey data suggest 
most 'informal* workers have 2/3 or 3/4 to 5/4 the minimum wage 
averaging 3/4 but in other cases gaps of 2 or 3 to 1 seem to be 
common (e.g. Ndola, Dakar - Pekine, Nairobi).
e. Urban (formal) wage-earners have, in general, never been an 
affluent group in SSA. But until the 1970s they were rarely among 
the more vulnerable except in cases of severe economic chaos such 
as characterized Ghana and Zaire from the mid-1960s. This is now 
less uniformly true. First, some countries have deliberately 
sought to shield peasants with the result that taking self consumed 
food/housing at urban prices average (not poorest 40Í) peasant 
household consuming power is near to above munimum wage (the 
extreme case is Tanzania where it was ca 75% in 1967, 100% in 1980 
and 125% by 1984) because wage purchasing power has fallen faster. 
Second, wages in many SSA economies have risen less rapidly than 
urban (or grower) food prices (e.g. Nigeria 1977-82) while base 
level surveys show high starting year and higher subsequent year 
urban malnutrition. Third, in economic chaos countries - e.g. 
Zaire, Uganda, Ghana - demonstrably no wage (and at any plausible 
consumption pattern almost no salary) earner can live on his formal 
income so guessing informal income pattern/deprivation impact is 
hard, i.e. clearly most Kinshasa and Kampala workers do have 
'second' incomes but most vulnerable unskilled workers have limited 
access to such incomes and are at sub-subsistence levels.
f. Some people shift (are flung) from non-vulnerable to vulnerable:
i. drought/flood/insurgency hit peasants (the drought cases are
the best known and largest numbers affected in half SSA
countries but actual deaths linked to lack of food are
highest, e.g. Mozambique, Ethiopia where drought cuts basic 
own food supply and insurgency/invasion prevents effective
emergency supply provision);
ii. urban newly unemployed from loss of formal (or informal)
jobs. With limited (negligible) social security they become
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vulnerable entrants into urban informal (or marginal peasant) 
groups;
iii. school leavers who 'graduate* into rural landlessness, urban 
unemployment or the bottom end of urban informal sectors.
At a rough guess 40Í of SSA people are vulnerable in any year. The % 
urban and rural may not be very different but that suggests 3-^ times as 
many rural as urban/peri-urban vulnerable people. The particular people 
vary from year to year - as does % - with extent and location of rural 
climactic (or other) catastrophe. Of these perhaps 10— 15% (20-25% in 
worst cases) are very vulnerable, i.e. their survival as normal human 
beings (health-strength-intelligence) or even as living persons is at 
risk. These most vulnerable are dominantly rural in almost all cases 
and are usually people in low productivity areas hit by successive 
climatic disasters and/or massive insurgency/civil disorder. However, 
on 1979-83 trends significant numbers of urban people are about to (or 
have) entered the very vulnerable category. (e.g. Tanzania studies 
suggest relatively static rural malnutrition in non-drought areas but 
rapidly rising low income urban malnutrition. Random observation 
suggests the urban poor of Kampala and Kinshasa have lower food 
availability than , the average Ugandan or - less clearly - Zairois 
peasant.) The í's and makeup vary significantly from country to 
country.
What the vulnerable individuals/households require is fairly easy to set 
out:
1. Access to adequate food supplies (beginning with basic staples 
since the worst deficiencies are usually in basic calorie intake 
although - especially for women and children - protein deficiencies 
may also require specific attention) whether self grown, purchased 
(requiring adequate real income) or provided (as relief or "food 
for work");
2. Access to employment or self employment adequate to produce enough 
and adequately paid enough to meet basic household food-shelter- 
clothing requirements (except in emergency situations which may be 
large and multi-year, e.g. Zimbabwe in the third year of drought
V  •
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has 2.1 million - 2856 of its population - needing food relief or 
work to pay for food because their incomes from self employment 
have been wiped out).
3. Access to pure water at a location and a cost which allows basic 
household consumption (drinking/cooking/washing/sanitation) to meet 
bodily and sanitation needs and to do so without huge (often 8 
hours per day per household) and exhausting (often 10-15 miles 
trudging with buckets) use of girls and women's time to collect it.
4. Access to basic health facilities (esp. vaccination-sanitation- 
simple curative - child + mother care) both for human reasons and 
because chronic ill health and high mortality impose crippling 
economic losses on vulnerable households, on national production 
and (through their permanent effect on children) on future 
production possibilities;
5. Access to basic (primary, applied, adult) education again for 
human, present production and (especially for children, women and 
peasants) future national production potential reasons.
6. In may cases (not, apparently, uniform but general in Eastern and 
Southern Africa and Sahel - e.g. Senegal) access to household fuel 
which has inordinate and growing cost either in terms of price or 
(dominantly the case in rural areas) time and energy to collect it 
from increasing distances (dominantly by girls and women).
How these needs can be met by vulnerable individuals/households varies. 
Clearly children's welfare cannot usually be safeguarded in respect to 
food, sanitation, clothing, water except in the household context and 
the same is largely true of expectant and nursing mothers. Equally 
clearly in the near total absence of formal public or private social 
security, emergency survival needs can only be met by public 
expenditure. The cases for free food distribution, selective food 
subsidies and/or food for work are debateable as are programme designs 
but to opt against all is to opt for massive pressure in vulnerable 
human beings and - literally - for the premature death of some, or many, 
of them.
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Similarly there is no way private or full cost recovery public 
programmes can meet the vulnerable individual's maximum health care, 
education or water needs. There is a case for mobilizing labour time to 
lower costs (e.g. in facility construction/maintenance) and may be a 
case for partial fees (waived for the poorest) but the basic condition 
for access by the vulnerable is that the basic cash cost be borne by the 
state (out of general revenue or specific external assistance).
In respect to employment and self employment the situation is different. 
The state cannot afford to provide the bulk of such employment - except 
in some cases in temporary emergency 'relief' type public works as used 
satisfactorily in some Indian States and being tried in Zimbabwe. For 
the vulnerable what is needed is state action to assist them to raise 
productivity (e.g. basic field tested/viability tested/farmer tested 
research and extension/improved human-livestock-crop water supply) and 
to ensure mimumum fair remuneration (e.g. wage and grower price policy). 
SSA states cannot be (and do not in general try) general employers of 
last resort if only because however useful the services produced an 
implausible balance of public services to basic consumption goods would 
result. (The case of Mauritius' "travail pour tous" programme 
demonstrates the general unviability fiscally - especially under 
conditions of economic adversity. That of Botswana - which has achieved 
a very significant proportion of households supported by genuine public 
sector jobs consistent with fiscal and external balance - illustrates a 
further limitation. In the absence of the jobs an additional 10? of 
Botswana households would be vulnerable. But these jobs take up so much 
of the fiscal resources that little remains to raise productivity (as 
opposed to provide basic services) for the 40-50? of rural households 
who remain very poor and - often - vulnerable.)
III. Economic Contraction's Impact On Vulnerable People
The general economic malaise of SSA did not begin until 1979-80. Over 
1976-79 African economies averaged over 6? annual GDP growth - their 
best four year record and above that for all developing countries (UN 
Dept, of Int'l Econ and Social Affairs data). This does not mean that 
the problems of chronically sick (and quite possibly chronically ill
managed) economies like Zaire and Ghana, chronically resource poor 
countries like Upper Volta, and states stricken by domestic
oppression/insurgency or invasion like CAR, Uganda, Chad, Mozambique, 
Angola are all equally recent. Nor does it imply that whatever the
causes one can assume a rapid return to 1976-79 conditions and therefore 
conduct ’holding' rather than 'adjustment' policies. (Indeed the
dominant SSA mistake over 1978-81 was precisely to expect 1981 and after 
to return to 1976-79 as 1976-79 had been a recovery - to higher growth 
levels than 1970-73 - after 1974-75.) But it is to say that in most of 
SSA the mechanism of economic decline began with severe external shocks 
(terms of trade, export volume demand, weather, and/or invasion) not
with overheating via vast increases in real resource use and that that 
starting point is relevant both to the impact on vulnerable people and
to how they can be protected within consolidation and recovery
programmes.
The impact of terms of trade shifts initially falls primarily on major 
users of imports and producers of exports. These may well not be 
primarily vulnerable people (export crops are dominantly produced by 
above average rural income households in most SSA countries albeit there 
are significant country - e.g. Sahel - and crop - e.g. cashew - 
exceptions). Whether vulnerable groups are greatly affected at the
first round by import price increases depends largely on what prices and 
the degree of staple food self sufficiency. Fuel price increases are 
especially damaging because via the general use of fuel and the
prevalence of cost plus pricing they rapidly generalize themselves. If 
staple food imports are significant then import price increases have a 
direct impact on vulnerable urban persons.
The direct impact of climatic shocks is much more concentrated on the 
vulnerable. They tend - almost by definition - to be concentrated in 
ecologically marginal rural areas and their 'normal' household income is 
very near survival level so that output losses fall heavily on them. In 
the context of forex constraints, domestic food prices will rise sharply 
so that the urban vulnerable households will also be significantly 
affected.
The secondary rounds generalize the impact. External imbalance widens
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(tending to cause overvalued exchange rates which then become themselves 
an obstacle to recovery of balance) and imports are cut. Employment at 
best stagnates and wages fall relative to prices. Lower real export
prices (not surprisingly) lead to lower growth (or actual falls) in 
exports. Lower imports cut manufactured output by a multiple of the 
initial cut. Government revenue in real terms falls rapidly as (1)
external trade in real terms contracts, (2) real wages and salaries are
eroded, (3) company profits fall, (4) local manufacturing (the sales and 
excise tax base) slumps. This leads to cutbacks which tend to be
especially severe (e.g. Zambia, Tanzania) on health, education, water 
and to limit emergency relief to climatic disaster stricken areas 
(generally effective in Tanzania in 1973/74 and 1974/75 but reaching 
only the most weather blighted and chronic low income areas after
1978/79) and to force either very rapid real increases in urban food 
prices or real cuts in grower food prices (or a combination of the 
two). Parallel to this there is likely to be high (by SSA standards
15-20% is high and over 20% very high except for disaster cases like 
Ghana, Zaire, Uganda) and self-validating inflation and the emergence of 
parallel markets especially for food and imports. The vulnerable rarely 
have the ability to profit from inflation or parallel markets and at 
least the rural poor have to buy on the latter more than consumers as a 
whole (the urban vulnerable may be more able to have access to some 
price controlled or rationed staples, e.g. Maputo, Dar es Salaam).
Clearly, a) the precise mechanisms and initial shocks vary widely; b) 
in some cases there was initial overheating as well (e.g. Zimbabwe 
1980-81/Zimbabwe’s external environment ecological shocks are late, i.e. 
1981/82 on, not 1979/80 on - ); c) domestic policy errors before or 
after the shocks (e.g. 19 61 — 1980 low attention to export expansion in
Tanzania, belated and unselective import cuts in Kenya and Nigeria) has
often exacerbated matters. The point is that in most cases the 
mechanism is one of an external shock reversing a relatively 
satisfactory previous trend or period.
IV. Internal Mechanisms Of Vulnerability Pressure Increases
The previous section has sketched the broad scenario of economic
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contraction's impact on the vulnerable. (For the vast majority of SSA 
economies 1980—83 has seen per capita real output falls. As it has also 
seen negative terms of trade shifts of up to 15% of GDP the per capita 
falls in command over real resources are even sharper.) A few more 
points on internal mechanisms may be useful, albeit these appear to vary 
in detail quite markedly within and between countries and time periods. 
The emphasis is on vulnerable people not overall income distribution for 
three reasons: a) the overall income distribution results are somewhat
more problematic, more sub-category (e.g. salary earners, medium scale 
food sellers, transporters) specific; b) income distribution has been 
significantly affected by policy in some cases independent of a general 
decline in resources per capita (on the face of it toward lesser 
inequality in Tanzania and greater in Zambia - also greater in Botswana 
but that is a real resource increase case and is the reverse of the 
clear policy intent); c) if real resources per capita are falling the 
possibility that they are falling less rapidly for vulnerable people is 
not enough to protect them (or at least may not be) because they have 
less margin above severe deprivation in the first place.
Urban low income households have been hit by:
a. rapidly rising food prices (parallel and open market combined with 
static or cut subsidies);
b. wages rising less rapidly than prices and especially food prices 
(both general public policy and the result of budget constraints on 
public sector wages and the general weakness of demand for labour 
have influenced this);
c.' stagnant or falling "formal" wage employment;
d. increased pressure on the "informal" sector (natural population 
growth, school leaver bulge accentuated by impact of higher fees, 
migration from rural areas especially those with land pressure 
and/or ecological disasters) which combine with falling wage earner 
real purchasing power (especially excluding food) to force down 
real incomes of this vulnerable group;
e. deterioration in ' quality and sometimes (especially relative to 
growing population) of basic health-education-water services and of 
access to services because of higher fees;
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f. general rapid price increases for basic commodities, e.g cloth, 
clothing, soap.
Rural vulnerable households have been hit by:
a. rapid rises in transport costs and commercial margins (relating to 
fuel costs and shortages' increasing of monopolistic elements 
whether in open or parallel markets) so that the rise in grower 
food prices significantly lags that in urban (even abstracting from 
official price policy or in countries - e.g. Nigeria - where there 
is none with respect to food);
b. decreased availability of basic production inputs down to and 
including hoes and seed with resultant negative impact on output 
(and with vulnerable least able to use cash or influence to get 
what inputs are available);
c. radically deteriorated public services (e.g. rural health 
facilities in rural Northern Zambia have become virtually 
non-functional for lack of supplies and transport; the % of rural 
water units with significant 'breakdown time' annually in Tanzania 
is approaching 50% and the lag to repair lengthening) and increased 
fees for their use; /
d. sharply reduced seasonal, casual or temporary job availability. 
(Even in Tanzania over 25% of peasant household cash income in the 
mid-1970s came from off-farm employment. This appears to have had 
a bimodal distribution. It was significant to above average income 
peasant households, much less so for the middle band, but more so 
for very low income ones. A similar pattern appears to hold in
' Botswana.);
e. reduced transfers from urban relatives (because of their falling 
real incomes);
f. reduced access to buyers (public or private) because of transport 
gaps (e.g. in 1983, 60-75,000 tonnes of potatoes in Tanzania's 
Southern Highlands rotted because the - previously fairly effective 
if high cost - private sector buyers failed to secure transport) 
and delays in payment after sale (especially a public sector 
failing but not uniquely so);
g. ecological (drought, flood, bush or forest fire) and civil 
(invasion, insurgency, etc) disasters combined with reduced or
- 12 -
halt ed government food relief and/or rural works employment 
programmes.
V. IMF Programme Problems For Protecting Vulnerable People
This critique is not meant to imply that consolidation and adjustment 
can be cost free. It is to argue that how the costs are distributed is 
critical and has some degrees of freedom whatever the overall level of 
restrainment. However, it is also arguable that in low income economies 
with falling per. capita command over resources set off or greatly 
aggravated by external shocks (rather than endogenous overheating) and 
with much domestic capacity (including that of poor peasants starved of 
transport, inputs and markets) by lack of forex no consolidation is 
likely to be possible without more resources as well as different 
resource allocation. That combination may not apply to all SSA cases 
(e.g. not to Botswana’s successful 1981/2 adjustment but does to many 
low, e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Upper Volta and to some middle, e.g. Zambia, 
Zimbabwe income countries.
IMF advice/conditionality tends to be both specific and faily rigid as 
to general targets and fairly unselective within them. This may or may 
not be true at the highest policy, analytical and research levels - it 
certainly is true of the typical SSA country mission.
Key examples include:
a. Reduction of real public expenditure especially on recurrent 
account. In general no full or partial exemption is made for those 
areas, e.g. basic health, education, water, drought relief most 
critical to the vulnerable - au contraire in some cases;
b. Reduction/elimination of subsidies to consumers no matter on what 
products, for whom (e.g. marginal or middle income), what % of 
govt, spending or with what impact on vulnerable groups. Many 
subsidies, e.g. gasoline and milk may be misconceived economically 
and/or in terms of income distribution. This is not self evident 
in terms of those on staple grain when a high % of urban consumers
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are in vulnerable groups and do have access to the grain. Some 
programmes have crippling costs. But SSA states have very few 
transfer payments to consumers (basically basic goods subsidies and 
drought relief) - notably so by comparison with world and even 
general developing country share of government spending. Thus to 
argue for nil subsidies on principle appears rather extreme. This 
is especially true of calls for instant elimination or savage cuts 
when the impact on prices will be such as to make vulnerable groups 
suffer markedly and to have social, political and production (e.g. 
riots, strikes, alienation) impacts hardly conducive to support for 
and production under much more quantitatively significant aspects 
of the programme. In some cases subsidy elimination seems to be 
set up as a dogma independent of its actual impact and with the 
result of bogging down all disussion. e.g. in Tanzania one product 
(maize meal) is subsidized. The budgetary impact is 2% or less of 
recurrent spending (plus V% odd cross price subsidy from sugar). 
The impact of instant removal on urban worker budgets (their 
purchasing power has been cut over 50% since 1981 at minimum wage 
and informal vulnerable group levels) would be severe. Whatever 
the merits of phased reduction to lay central stress on this item 
for immediate change appears theological not pragmatic or 
quantitative. Phased reduction consistent with vulnerable group 
protection may be workable in certain contexts, e.g. the 1983 
Zimbabwe subsidy cuts combined with parallel low (not general) wage 
increases and drought relief (albeit the impact on urban informal 
vulnerable people may have been severe) - the case for making early 
elimination central to all programmes is very weak. (It may also 
distract attention from medium term phase out approaches which are 
seen as irrelevant to satisfying the IMF and cause an equally 
theological reaction against any lowering of subsidies - both 
evident in Tanzania over 1981-8 3 .)
c. General raising of grower food prices as the cure all for 
production problems. This may have been a sensible prescription in 
most of SSA in 1977; it is far less generally relevant in 19 83 and 
is far from a complete answer. Relative to wages these prices have 
skyrocketed over the past 5 or 6 years with clear negative impact 
on the urban vulnerable and little positive on either the rural
vulnerable or production. More careful analysis is needed. 
Absence of transport, access to inputs and markets is often more of 
a barrier to increased effective production than price. In the 
absence of resources to produce more goods to sell to farmers (e.g./ 
of import constrained domestic manufactures) higher food prices 
simply increase inflation and parallel marketing with negative 
social and income distribution and marginal (at best) output 
effects. Further in much of SSA no prices will produce grain 
surpluses during droughts (e.g. 1920's - 1960's historic record
Zimbabwe and Tanzania) while present prices are already adequate to 
do so if weather is good (some countries, indeed 1984 crop season 
prices in Tanzania especially for maize are wildly too high by any 
plausible test). The confusion of price as a selective, partial 
instrument with its use a near single brute force bulldozer is 
serious generally and especially in impact on vulnerable groups 
(not least when taken together with govt, spending curbs it forces 
cuts in drought relief food distribution).
Lowering real wages and salaries (especially wages - IMF missions 
tend to be more sympathetic to salary earner complaints of draconic 
falls in real purchasing power, at least in SSA) has its limits 
especially as to minimum wages (and to informal sector incomes 
which, to a varying degree, tend to move with them) and especially 
when 50% of more falls from late 1970's levels are not unusual (and 
ones of less than 25% uncommon). When pushed to extremes like 
Zaire and Uganda all that is created is opaqueness - minimum (and 
other) wage earners do not live on their wages. How they do
survive is less clear but is unlikely to be in ways consistent with
the productivity/efficiency/or probity of their work for their 
'primary' employer.
Multiplying and raising user fees especially hard for vulnerable 
households to bear (e.g. standpipe or rural water, radio and 
bicycle licenses, primary school fees, clinic and drug charges). 
These - especially in the absence of widely used waiver provisions 
- in fact deny access to those most needing the services. Their 
fiscal value is rarely great and their use of scarce administrative
and policy personnel almost always a gross resouce misallocation
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especially if there are effective (for the poor) waiver provisions, 
(e.g. in Tanzania a 1/10 increase in the tax on beer would produce 
about three to four times the revenue of this category of fees and 
a'doubling of the passenger car annual licence fee about as much 
both at negligible marginal cost as the collection procedures are 
relatively automatic and their cost unrelated to the amount of the 
tax.)
f. The combination of import price increases, import liberalisation 
(in terms of reduced licensing and allocation) and import reduction 
has an especially negative impact on public services. In the 
absence of any likely true equilibrium exchange rate (the market 
will not in most SSA countries clear at - say - 1972 constant real 
exchange rates even when those were not considered overvalued) and 
the presence of govt, spending constraints only allocation of 
import capacity and some budgetary adjustment for devaluation can 
prevent near total destruction of rural health, education, water
(and often agricultural extension services) by pricing them out of 
drugs, medical and educational supplies, books and paper, basic
equipment, fuel, vehicles and spares.
Needless to say, the absence of an IMF programme does not resolve 
these problems. In many SSA economies to attempt that causes such 
inadequate forex availability and such sustained output fall that - 
no matter if serious efforts are made to mitigage consequence for 
vulnerable people - the results are still profoundly unsatisfactory 
(e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, Nigeria). Indeed the one 'successful* 
IMF type programme without the IMF - Rhodesia (as it then was)
1975-78 underlines the likely consequences of a do it yourelf
austerity programme. External imbalance (and external borrowing) 
was contained as (except in 1978 with war spending) was government 
recurrent balance. Price increases were kept low without major 
subsidies and interest rates were also low without any evident 
tendency for savings to fall below demand. But real output 
declined steadily, per capita it fell on average about 5% a year. 
Food production rose 1/2 to 2/3 as fast as population. Fixed 
investment levels were so low that in the long run overall 
productive capacity would have declined. This was stabilisation
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but on a declining trend with little reason to expect a reversal.
In this case it was stabilisation made possible by pushing most of 
the burdens on the most vulnerable - real African wages and peasant 
incomes declined, access to jobs and land worsened. While the 
Rhodesian Front's priorities are extreme it is true that under very 
extreme resource constraints both production and political concerns 
will prejudice the interests of the vulnerable who are rarely key 
producers nor the most significant political actors. One purpose 
of IMF programmes is presumably to provide (directly or indirectly) 
forex resources to lessen the constraints in the short run until 
enhanced production can do so in the medium and longer term.
VI. IMF Analytical Limitations In Terms of Protecting Vulnerable People (and 
more generally in respect to SSA?)
The programmes problems turn in part on IMF missions' rather simple and 
uniform analytical assumptions and approaches which often appear to 
relate to objective physical, structural, institutional and output 
realities other than those of most SSA states/economies. These include:
a. failure to set minimum necessary imports for halting decline, 
maintaining basic physical and service production and 
infrastructure capacity and instituting a process of output 
recovery as the vital target and building the programme around it. 
(In practice SSA fund missions usually treat it as a residual even 
when they accept the need to raise, not cut imports. This is not 
true of Bank SAP missions who do seem actual identification of 
minimum import requirements and working out how to finance them as 
crucial.) Without such a core target no programme can do more than 
make continued decline more orderly and - perhaps - less rapid;
b. a (related?) assumption that unsustainable increases in resource 
use rather than sudden decreases in resource availability have set 
off the cumulative malaise. This is more often than not quite 
inaccurate in SSA and has a direct bearing on the cost of further 
cuts and of what is/is not practicable in terms of laying a base 
for recovery. It is not evident that resource use cuts (private or
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public) in much of SSA will restore balance because they are likely 
to accelerate the fall in resource supply (production);
c. an overemphasis on undifferentiated macro analysis without 
adequate regard to differential micro factors generally or in
relation to protecting vulnerable people;
d. a related overemphasis on prices as almost uniquely necessary and 
sufficient conditions which both is particularly injurious to 
vulnerable individuals and by itself is so incomplete and 
oversimplified as to be at best inadequate and at worst
counterproductive. (All Tanzania's 40Í odd average 1983/84 grower
price increase will achieve that a 20-25Í one would not is more 
inflation and more constraint on real government spending. If
weather is significantly better output and exports will rise and 
the price impact on cost of living be minimized. Similarly if more 
forex for transport, inputs, processing is procured that can help 
raise effective production/domestic supply and exports. But the 
weather and the forex not the excessive price increases based on a 
naive view that real incomes can be raised by nominal price 
increases in the face of output falls nominal price incentives 
cannnot reverse.);
e. an also related overemphasis on undifferentiated gross fixed 
capital formation in new capacity. In the short run maintenance 
and less underutilisation of existing capacity (including 
institutional and basic service) is what most SSA economies (and
1 especially their vulnerable members) need most urgently. (Given 
forex constraints and the high direct and indirect forex content - 
often 60 to 75% - of most GFCF there is a direct tradeoff between 
early output recovery and growth of potential - but unuseable - 
output capacity by raising investment.) Selective GFCF in export 
and effective import substitute (especially food and energy) 
production is needed - and at least on the food and some export 
production can be designed to increase incomes and reduce climatic 
vulnerability of vulnerable rural people;
f. inadequate attention to timing. Shock programmes with dislocations
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and costs front loaded (early) and adjustments and gains backloaded 
(late) have very grave disadvantages - as contrasted to more 
gradual and balanced moves with at least some gains front end 
loaded:
i. very large price or other changes take one so far outside 
known parameters that prediction of side effects (especially 
on the vulnerable) is very difficult and therefore timely 
action to mitigate harmful ones almost impossible;
ii. very large price changes tend to set off self cancelling 
inflation to an extent lesser ones might not and thus to 
become the basis for a hydro-inflation/hyper-’adjustment' 
cycle of a distinctly undesirable type. This is 
particularly true when massive price increases are put in 
place 3 to 9 months before higher output can be achieved 
(import to production to distribution and or crop season 
lags) so that the immediate result is massive real income 
reduction;
iii. poor, vulnerable individuals and economies have very limited 
ability to survive initial costs until gains come. Shock 
cures for the basically healthy may overcome a fever 'when 
for the really ill and debilitated they produce pneumonia or 
worse. To ask an average Belgian worker (or an upper income 
African civil servant who may have a similar real income) to 
accept sacrifice now for rewards in 18-24 months is not the 
same thing as to ask it of an African low income household 
already malnourished, inadequately clothed and washed, 
barely able to afford clinic and school fees for themselves 
and their children. They may literally be dead or too 
weakened to benefit in 18-24 months; even if the programme 
succeeds at macro level which (on the IMF's own evaluation) 
a majority of those since 1979 in SSA do not do.
g. Serious underestimation of natural, cyclical disasters - e.g. 
drought - which can be expected to reverse themselves and, 
therefore, are logically primarily targets for accommodation until 
recovery not for adjustment to a permanently worsened context. 
African drought problems are severe but not - in general
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permanent. e.g. Tanzania had severe drought in 1972/73 and 1973/74 
and an abnormally long run of good years over 1974/75 - 1977/78 
before bad years in 1978/79, 1979/80, 1981/82 and 1982/83.
Zimbabwe had bad years in 1974/75, 1976/77 and 1981/82, 1982/83, 
1983/84 with fair to very good between. (Storage and production 
vulnerability reduction seem to have received inadequate attention 
in good years but that is not a problem primarily remediable by IMF 
conditions and indeed is one worsened by govt, spending limits and 
credit ceilings which hinder holding bumper crops to meet 
subsequent deficits). There is an exacerbating factor - droughts 
in Eastern and Southern Africa now seem to have become more bunched 
than over 1950-70 (partly a reversion to earlier patterns) with 
more succesive good or bad years which makes both "riding out" and 
storing for bad years harder. The point is not that the IMF 
ignores drought but that it seems to underestimate its impact and 
to view it as a case for adjustment by use cuts not for 
accommodation until cyclical recovery.
The degree of possible impact is illustrated by Zimbabwe (an 
economy whose agricultural share in GDP is very low by SSA 
' structural averages and is thus in one sense less vulnerable to 
weather).
a. Over 1980/81 - 1982/83 real agricultural output fell 32Í 
with a further small fall or very small recovery likely in 
1983/84 (also severely drought hit). The 1981/83 fall is 
equal to 5.5Í of 19 81 GDP (indeed it is virtually identical 
to the actual overall 1981—83 GDP fall);
b. had agricultural output remained constant at 1981 levels
real GDP would - on the primary impact alone - not have 
fallen;
c. export losses/import increases result from at least 1/3 of
the agricultural output loss. The overall import capacity 
multiplier is over 3 to 1 for the economy as a whole.
Further, other sectors (both manufacturing and services) 
have been negatively influenced by lack of agricultural 
inputs and rural demand. The secondary loss from drought 
has probably been 1 to I5 times the primary. Thus in the
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absence of drought real GDP in 1981 could have risen 2 to 
2\t> and in 1982 3? to 4Í consistent with no worse external 
imbalance or inflation as opposed to actual falls of 2% and 
respectively;
d. on govt, account recurrent budget spending on drought relief 
proper in 1983-84 is likely to exceed $150 million and 
direct plus indirect run over $200 million. This is 1^% 
plus of total recurrent spending and the same order of 
magnitude as the recurrent budget deficit (i.e. without it 
all net borrowing would be for capital and loan account).
This does not suggest the 1980-1981 growth spurt was sustainable 
nor that there were not also overheating problems (the recurrent 
deficit began in the late Rhodesian military spending and was not 
fully eliminated in the 1980-81 and 1981-82 pre-drought Zimbabwe 
budgets). It does suggest that the difference between slow growth 
and successful recurrent budget balancing and absolute decline with 
a rising recurrent deficit (despite restraint) is drought - a 
factor which is both beyond Zimbabwe’s control and - one can 
reasonably assume - cyclically self reversing.
The IMF cannot be expected to be independently expert at micro and 
sectoral level for each SSA economy - albeit higher levels of expertise 
than currently shown by many country missions can reasonably be 
expected. It can be expected to recognize that there are significant 
macro, sectoral and micro differences among and within SSA economies and 
to pay serious attention to analysis seeking to identify and illustate 
them. Similarly it can be expected to evaluate policy proposals based 
on such analysis - including policy proposals seeking to limit burdens 
on vulnerable groups and to accommodate cyclical exogenous factors such 
as drought - seriously and sensitively rather than treating them (as 
many country missions do) as at best irrelevant and at worst as attempts 
to evade making rather than altering the makeup of adjustment. Such 
proposals may well in some cases be unviable (and some are unsound 
special pleading, not necessarily for the vulnerable) but to 
characaterize all as such from the start is to raise the cost of 
adjustment unnecessarily, to reduce national commitment to whatever 
progrramme is adopted, to protract negotiations while the underlying
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problems become more intractable and - in extreme cases - to lead to 
programmes which objectively have no real chance of success (in IMF or 
national) terms.
VII. Practical Problems Of Implied Alterations In Approach For IMF
The programme changes flowing - at least implicitly - from the above 
critique include:
a. longer time periods - of drawings, grace and repayment to 
accommodate more phased adjustment, more accommodation of (versus 
short term contraction in response to) short term/self correcting 
cyclical factors and protecting the most vulnerbale from at least 
part of the costs of adjustment that would fall on them in the 
absence of special measures;
b. acceptance of the necessity (for production consolidation and 
recovery) of higher (than at present or in most programmes) import 
targets (and presumably either of larger IMF and associated 
programme funding or/and susbtantial long term rescheduling of debt 
at lower interest rates plus some lengthening of the period 
targeted for arrears elimination where - e.g. Zambia, Tanzania 
these are very large. Programmes in which over 50$ or over 75$ of 
drawings are targeted to arrears reduction, e.g. Tanzania 1980 and 
late 1983 proposals are not likely to be viable nationally or to 
meet even the arrears reduction target except in very special 
circumstances.);
c. recognition of the facts of divergent causes of extreme external 
and domestic imbalance, of differences at micro and sectoral level 
and of the need to reduce adjustment costs to vulnerable rural and 
urban groups and the implications these have for diversity of 
national programmes as to micro, sectoral and timing targets and 
macro target makeup as well as the limits they impose on 
practicable reduction in macro, sectoral and vulnerable group 
resource use.
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These changes would require:
1. More resources (whether from the IMF or in an associated package);/
2. In general over longer periods;
3. With more acceptance of different makeup of national adjustment 
packages, more attention to sectoral and micro issues and more 
tolerance of expenditures (relief, temporary works programmes, 
subsidies, basic health/education/water/fuel/agricultural input - 
extension - vulnerability reduction) targeted to buffer vulnerable 
individuals/groups and likely to be reasonably effective in doing 
so.
4. More flexible targets in respect to timing and absolute attainments 
with some automatic or quasi automatic adjustment when either a) 
initial position data estimates turn out to have been seriously 
inaccurate; b) external economic environment changes are radically 
worse than projected and/or c) the results of carrying out agreed 
measures are lesser or slower than projected or create negative 
side effects for vulnerable groups requiring expenditure on govt, 
account to limit to tolerable levels. (This is not an ideological 
point. Projections from an uncertain base under conditions of 
external uncertainty and unclear probable magnitude and timing of 
response to policy changes do not logically lead to fixed point 
quarterly targets. That view is shared by conservative monetarists 
- e.g. Prof. Harberger - and mainstream monetary - e.g. Prof. J. 
Williamson - as well as moderate monetary system critics, e.g. 
Professor Helleiner - analysts.)
The difficulties such alterations would pose for the IMF are not
trivial. They include:
a. paying more attention to differences in economic imbalance 
causation; to sectoral, micro and institutional issues and 
therefore to alternative (and sometimes unorthodox) national 
adjustment programme makeup. There is an efficiency case for this 
quite independent of limiting negative impact on vulnerable groups.
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But to do so would require a significant change in outlook and of 
approach to specific national proposals especially at the level of 
most SSA country missions;
b. the IMF cannot practicably set an infinite number of micro targets.
If - as appears desirable - a limited number of macro range or 
direction (rather than point) targets and policy instrument actions 
are agreed then both the reality of uncertainty and the need to 
accommodate rather divergent national realities and capacities 
within a common typology of targets require more qualitative and 
sensitive monitoring of performance which in turn requires more and 
more SSA expertise endowed personnel than seem to be available now 
in respect to most SSA countries. (This again is not an 
ideological point - Prof. Helleiner in his Princeton monograph and 
elsewhere is much more scathing on the average quality of personnel 
and specific data/knowledge of IMF SSA missions.)
c. longer drawing (e.g. up to 5 years), grace (e.g. up to 3 years 
after the last drawing) and repayment (e.g. up to seven years for a 
possible maximum of 15 years from programme initiation to final 
repayment) periods will pose problems for the IMF. However, they 
are not inconsistent with IMF objectives. Where shorter programmes 
cannot achieve sustainable consolidation and lay the basis of 
sustainable recovery they are inefficient in terms of the IMF’s 
Articles as well as gravely damaging to vulnerable groups of 
people.
d. more funds would be required whether from the IMF, from other 
multilateral and bilateral agencies or from debt rescheduling/de 
facto (e.g. lengthened maturity - lowered interest rate) partial 
writeoffs. All are hard to secure. But the cost to vulnerable 
people, to sustainable growth in SSA and to world trade and finance 
of not doing so is likely to be high and long lasting.
Therefore, a case for seeing how the problems could be overcome and the
costs met exists.
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VIII. Some Sugestions For IMF Action
a. More attention to the specific needs of vulnerable groups 
especially children in the context of adjustment/consolidation 
programmes including serious attention to expert agency (e.g. 
UNICEF, IFAD, ILO, IBRD) analysis and advice and to national 
proposals oriented to meeting such needs;
b. more willingness to recognize diversity including diversity of 
potentially viable programme components;
c. more flexibility in phasing and in target level adjustment to take 
account of uncertainty in initial (IMF-Country agreed) projections.
These require primarily alterations in IMF personnel - and especially 
country mission personnel. To a degree senior policy and research 
personnel do accept and express them but they do not appear to be taken 
seriously by most SSA country missions. Nor do most other agencies see 
the IMF as concerned with these issues so that a public restatement/ 
adjustment of the concerns to be taken into account in negotiating 
programmes would be needed.
d. As a result national programmes would need to be more diverse in 
length, agreed policy instruments and national objectives (some of
which - in particular vulnerable group protection - would not be
’trigger clauses' but would affect practicable levels of, e.g. 
government expenditure and borrowing which are 'trigger clauses') 
with average and total increases in programme length and finance 
requirements.
e. Realistically only part of these additional financing requirements 
can come from the IMF. In particular specific finance for interim 
protection of vulnerable groups and medium/longer term reduction of 
their vulnerability and enhancement of their productive
capabilities and incomes is not very well suited to IMF drawings 
except in the case of fairly short and not very severe cases (e.g. 
1981/82 Botswana) where a portion of general forex availability
enhancement from 1st/2nd Credit Tranches and Compensatory Finance 
may be available for and adequate to that end and specific external 
financing be unnecessary.
f. Therefore in most SSA cases the IMF should take the lead (jointly
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with the country and perhaps another international agency) in 
seeing that a wider and larger package involving other agencies 
(multilateral and bilateral) in new funds; debt rescheduling 
adequate in amount, period, and terms to permit recovery; and 
arrears consolidation and phased reduction is put together. 
Specific national proposals to protect (short term) and improve the 
position of (medium and longer term) vulnerable people and groups 
should have - and be said by the IMF to have - priority within 
these packages.
g. Package approaches (or IMF programme associated finance) are not 
novel in concept. The IMF ’seal of approval’ has consistently been 
seen as critical to unlocking other resources. Logically this 
applies to concessional and semi concessional finance at least as 
much as to investment and commercial borrowing even though the IMF 
has not, by and large, stressed this aspect. However, seal of 
approval without overt IMF initiatives/arm twisting is at present 
not enough. This is evident in respect to the IMF initiatives to 
secure associated commercial bank lending to certain major debtors 
(e.g. Brazil). A case for analagous aid mobilisation/debt burden 
lessening exists for a majority of SSA programmes. Without such 
added resources on a timely basis (if they are long delayed the 
fund programme is likely to break down before the complementary 
resources needed to achieve its targets become available) it is 
hard to see how most SSA fund programmes can achieve consolidation, 
let alone sustainable recovery and least of all special attention 
to reducing negative impact on vulnerable human beings.
It should be clear that it is not argued that the IMF should - or can -
become the primary champion of vulnerable groups of people.
(No more is it likely that Treasuries, Planning Ministries or 
Central Banks will play that role nationally even if some 
Treasuries - e.g. Tanzania, Zimbabwe - do seem more concerned with 
vulnerable group protection and income earning prospect improvement 
than most other institutions in their countries.)
The IMF should:
a. make clear that protection of the vulnerable and reduction of their 
future vulnerability are legitimate priority objectives;
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b. accept that meeting these objectives is a (not the only) constraint 
on appropriate programme targets and policy instruments;
c. encourage other agencies (bilateral and multilateral) to look
favourably on specific where able group welfare and vulnerability 
reduction (earned income enhancement and stabilisation) oriented 
programmes/projects in the allocation of their resources.
d. to do this in action as well as declaration and at country mission 
as well as 'higher* levels.
Equally IMF teams - if they have studied the topics and country
circumstances enough to have valid detailed opinions - are well within 
their briefs to comment on the probable cost efficiency (in terms of
benefits to vulnerable groups per unit of govt, finance, forex or real 
resources expended) of proposed and alternative measures. For example 
it is arguable that well designed rural and urban labour intensive works 
programmes are more effective than food relief (or especially than food 
subsidies) in assisting vulnerable households now and especially in 
providing future income and basic service capacity. However, to be 
effective they require either reallocation of investment resources or 
higher expenditure (than food distribution) because of the complementary 
personnel, tools and inputs needed if they are to be more than 'make 
work' efforts. In other cases food subsidy phaseout over 2 to 4 years 
with parallel offsetting wage increases to low income groups may be more 
effective in protecting the vulnerable and be so at lower public
expenditure cost than continued subsidies. However, for this to be true 
there must either be convincing evidence that "informal” sector incomes 
do in fact rise when the munimum wage does or some programme 
specifically targeted to raise informal urban income earning 
opportunities or the most vulnerable urban groups will be the hardest 
hit even if minimum wage earners are protected.
There is evidence that many SSA programmes intended to protect 
vulnerable groups are not very effective at meeting their goals and are 
high cost in relation to actual benefits to poor people. Improvement is 
needed and dialogue on how to achieve it would not, in general, be 
unwelcome. However, so long as the IMF is perceived as opposed to such 
programmes in general its ability to influence their makeup or 
efficiency will be low and its specific criticisms, however justified,
fall largely on deaf ears. To be effective specific criticisms and 
proposals of alternatives must be seen to flow from an acceptance that 
present protection of vulnerable people and reduction of their future 
vulnerability are genuine priority objectives.
(Written by Prof. Green and 
transcribed in hj.s absence)
